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____Va. _ , __ S.E.2d -, (1988)
September 23, 1988
FACTS
Tony Albert Mackall was indicted and tried for capital
murder in the commission of a robbery while armed with a
deadly weaspon, § 18.2-31 (d), and for robbery and the display
of a firearm in a threatening manner. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31
(d) (1988). Mackall was accused of shooting Mary Dahn who
was a cashier at the Riverview Shell Service Station, while rob-
bing the cash drawer of $515.00. Mrs. Dahn's husband, Stephen
Dahn, was hanging Christmas lights at the front of the station
when the robbery occurred. Their daughters April and Julie,
ages five and six, were also present at the station. April testified
that she saw a masked black man shoot her mother in the head,
then run away. A jury convicted Mackall of all three crimes.
His punishment was fixed at life imprisonment on the robbery
charge and two years' confinement on the firearm charge. In
the second phase of the bifurcated trial on the capital murder
charge, the jury heard evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and fixed Mackall's sentence at death, based on
his future dangerousness. (see Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4
(1983). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court confirmed the
death sentence fixed by the jury on the capital murder charge.
The Supreme Court of Virginia's review of the record
disclosed no reversible error, accordingly, the court affirmed the
judgments of the trial court.
ANALYSIS
The court considered and rejected a number of claims raised
by Mackall including:
a) A claim that a weapon was illegally seized;
b) Denial of motion to withdraw by one of his defense
counsel on the ground that the attorney had represented a pro-
secution witness in another matter;
c) Objection to the competence of 6 year old witness, April
Dahn, to testify;
d) Objection to admission of autopsy photographs and
medical examiner's use of a knitting needle and a styrofoam
head to demonstrate the trajectory of the bullet.
Interesting holdings raising federal questions included:
1. Limitations on Voir Dire:
Mackall alleged violations of his constitutional right to trial
by a fair and impartial jury, and violations of the provisions of
Code § 8.01-358, which requires the trial court to permit a
defendant to question prospective jurors as to bias or prejudice.
(see Va. Code Ann § 8.01-358 (1984) and Rule 3A:14 Rules of
the Supreme Ct. of Va.). Mackall complained that the trial
court improperly limited him to asking prospective jurors
whether their opinion of the death penalty would affect their
ability to consider life imprisonment or death as an appropriate
punishment. The trial court permitted Mackall to ask whether
any jurors had views as to the death penalty; it did not let
Mackall ask what those views were. The court found no holding
to support Mackall's proposition that a party may inquire what
prospective jurors' views of the death penalty might be.
The court's conclusion, citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed.2d 581 (1980), that the trial court pro-
perly limited Mackall's voir dire examination raises an intrigu-
ing question. How may an attorney conduct voir dire efficient-
ly, to determine whether or not a juror's views would "prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror
in accordance with his instructions and his oath." (Id. at 45), if
a party may not inquire what a prospective juror's views of the
death penalty might be? The well known case of Witherspoon
v. Illinois, as well as Patterson v. Commonwealth, necessarily
assume that the juror's views of the death penalty have been
disclosed. (See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct.
1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (Removal of jurors merely because
of general scruples against capital punishment denies due pro-
cess right to impartial jury; juror may be excluded for cause
only if he makes it "unmistakably clear" that he would
automatically vote against the death penalty or that he could
not be impartial as to guilt); See also Patterson v. Com-
monwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E.2d 212 (1981) (Death sentence
invalidated where trial court failed to preserve fully defendant's
right to a fair and impartial jury as to the penalty phase, since
the process of selection did not permit elimination for cause of
those veniremen who were biased in favor of the death penalty
under all circumstances as well as those who were biased against
its imposition under all circumstances).
2. Mitigation Evidence:
Mackall proffered the testimony of Patricia Hollingsworth,
his former probation officer, that following a previous convic-
tion but before his incarceration, Mackall had told her that
"because he had too many friends from the wrong group" at
Lorton, his proposed place of incarceration, he wanted to be
sent to another prison. The Commonwealth objected on the
grounds of relevance. The trial court excluded the testimony of
Hollingsworth as collateral and the Supreme Court found no
abuse of discretion.
The court's decision raises two interesting questions. First,
whether testimony regarding a desire not to be sent to a par-
ticular prison and associate with the "wrong group" is relevant
to mitigation in view of Lockett. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed.2d 973 (1978) (Death penalty
schemes must allow consideration "as a mitigating factor, of
any aspect of the defendant's character, record or circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.").
Second, whether such mitigating testimony is in fact "col-
lateral" in light of such decisions as Payne v. Commonwealth,
that "the choice between death and life imprisonment is the
ultimate issue for the jury" in a capital murder case. Payne v.
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 470, 357 S.E.2d 500, 506, cert.
denied, - U.S. _ , 108 S.Ct. 309 (1987). If the choice
between life and death is in fact an ultimate issue for the jury,
then mitigation evidence as defined broadly in Lockett is rele-
vant and simply not collateral. (Cecilia A. McGlew)
